Is there a self? Atman, anatta and what neuroscience finds

The Upanishads say the self is the one thing that never changes. The Buddha said there is no such thing. Brain scans have joined the argument, and they settle less than people claim.

A Tibetan wall mural of the bhavachakra, the wheel of life held by Yama, with the Buddha pointing outside it
Photo: Wonderlane from Seattle, USA, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

The Upanishads hold that the self (atman) is an unchanging witness behind all experience; the Buddha taught anatta, that no such permanent self can be found among the five aggregates of body and mind; and Nyaya argued for a self as the substance that owns memories and desires. Neuroscience finds no single "self centre" in the brain: self-related thinking runs through a network of cortical midline regions that can be quietened by meditation training. That fits the Buddhist picture of the narrative self well, but it cannot test the Advaita claim, because a pure witness has no content to scan.

Key takeaways
  • Three positions, not two: Advaita's witness, Nyaya's owner of mental states, the Buddhist ownerless stream.
  • Cortical midline structures handle self-related judgements; there is no single "self centre" (Northoff 2006).
  • 8 weeks of mindfulness training separated narrative and experiential self-reference in the brain (Farb 2007).
  • 10,565 hours: average practice of meditators whose default-mode hubs were quieter (Brewer 2011).
  • Untestable: a contentless witness, the Advaita self, gives a scanner nothing to measure.

The atman versus anatta debate is about 2,500 years old (the earliest Buddhist discourses date from about 450 BCE, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) and is usually staged as a draw between two religions. It is more interesting as a set of competing models, each of which makes claims about memory, change and experience.

Some of those claims now have data against them, some have data for them, and one sits permanently out of reach of an fMRI scanner. This essay works in three steps:

  1. the three classical Indian positions;
  2. the brain evidence on self-related thinking;
  3. a scorecard of what each view predicts and what has been tested.

What do the Upanishads mean by atman?

In the Upanishads, atman is the self that is aware but is never itself an object of awareness, and in its fullest form it is identical with Brahman, the ground of everything. The Kena Upanishad describes it as that by which the ear hears, not something the ear hears.

The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, through the sage Yajnavalkya, insists the seer cannot be seen, and approaches it by negation: not this, not that (neti neti).

Advaita Vedanta, systematised by Shankara around the 8th century CE, sharpened this into a radical claim. Everything that changes, including body, thoughts, emotions and the sense of being a particular person, belongs to the "not-self". What remains is pure consciousness, the witness (sakshin), which has no parts, no history and no location.

On this view, the feeling "I am this person, I am tired" is a mistake of superimposition: witness-consciousness confused with a body-mind. Our explainer on Advaita and Dvaita covers how other Vedanta schools kept a personal soul instead.

A painting of Adi Shankara seated by a river with his disciples
Shankara with his disciples. His Advaita reads the self as pure witness-consciousness, which is the one version of the self that no experiment can directly reach.Photo: Unknown authorUnknown author, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

What did the Buddha mean by anatta, or no-self?

Anatta means that nothing in experience qualifies as a permanent, independent self. The Buddha's method was inventory: a person is analysed into five aggregates (skandhas), and each is shown to be impermanent and not under full control:

  • form, the body;
  • feeling, pleasant, painful or neutral;
  • perception, recognising and labelling;
  • volitional formations, intentions and habits;
  • consciousness, the bare knowing of an object.

Of each, the instruction in the Majjhima Nikaya is to see it as "not mine, not I, not my self", according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's entry on mind in Indian Buddhism.

The story

The chariot image is older than any philosophy school. In the Pali Canon's Vajira Sutta (Samyutta Nikaya 5.10), the nun Vajira goes to sit for the day in the Grove of the Blind near Savatthi. Mara, the tempter, comes to break her concentration and asks in verse: who made this being, where is its maker, where does it arise and where does it end?

Vajira recognises him and answers that "a being" is only a label. Just as the word "chariot" is used when its parts are assembled, "a being" is the convention used when the aggregates are present; what actually arises and passes is only suffering. Mara, the text says, vanishes, dejected that she knew him. A woman practitioner gave the Buddhist no-self argument its most compact form.

Access to Insight: Vajira Sutta (SN 5.10), translated by Thanissaro Bhikkhu
The chariot argumentPartsPartsaxlewheelsframepole and yokeformfeelingperceptionformationsconsciousnesslabel: "chariot"label: "person"Search every part: no extra chariot-essence,and no extra self, is found (SN 5.10; Milindapanha).
The Buddhist inventory in one picture. The name is real as a convention; what it names is an arrangement of changing parts.

The best-known telling is in the Milindapanha, where the monk Nagasena tells King Milinda (the Indo-Greek ruler Menander, about 150 BCE) that "Nagasena" is a conventional name, just as "chariot" names an arrangement of axle, wheels and frame with no extra chariot-essence inside. Later, Vasubandhu (about 320 to 380 CE) devoted the ninth chapter of his Abhidharmakosa to refuting the person as a real entity, while allowing "person" as a useful label for a causal stream.

Buddhists still had to explain memory and karma without an owner. Their answer was continuity: momentary events cause later ones, and Vasubandhu's "seeds" carry traces forward the way a rice grain produces a sprout. The Pudgalavadin school pushed back from inside Buddhism, arguing that the person is neither the same as the aggregates nor different from them. The question of what then is reborn is the subject of our post on what gets reborn without a self, and the theory of moments behind it is in Buddhist momentariness and perception.

Why did Nyaya insist there must be a self?

Nyaya argued that some mental facts need a single owner who persists across time, and that a stream of momentary events cannot supply one. The Nyaya Sutra (around the 2nd century CE) lists six marks (linga) of the self:

  • desire and aversion;
  • effort;
  • pleasure and pain;
  • cognition.

The strongest case is recognition: when I see a mango and remember tasting one last year, the seeing and the remembering must belong to the same subject, or the memory would be like your remembering my breakfast.

The Nyaya self is very different from the Advaita witness. It is a substance with qualities, it is many (one per person), and in liberation it is stripped of its qualities, including consciousness itself. So the three positions are not two. They are a spectrum: Advaita's contentless witness, Nyaya's owner of mental states, and Buddhism's ownerless stream.

Three answers to "is there a self?"more selfless selfAdvaitapure witness,one with Brahman,no contentNyayaa substance thatowns desire, effort,memory; many selvesBuddhistno owner; a causalstream of fiveaggregatesMemory explained bywitness lightsevery statesame owner seesand rememberstraces, "seeds",causal continuityBrain imaging can test the right-hand claims about process;it cannot reach the left-hand witness.
The debate as a spectrum. Most brain evidence bears on the middle and right of the line; the Advaita witness sits outside what imaging measures.
QuestionUpanishads and AdvaitaNyayaBuddhist anatta
Is there a self?Yes, pure consciousness, one with BrahmanYes, a substance, one per personNo permanent self; a label for a stream
Is it conscious by nature?It is consciousnessNo; consciousness is a quality it gainsConsciousness is one of five changing aggregates
How is memory explained?Witness illumines all statesSame owner perceives and remembersCausal continuity, "seeds" or traces
What changes?Only the not-selfThe self's qualitiesEverything, moment to moment
Key text or thinkerBrihadaranyaka Upanishad; Shankara, c. 8th centuryNyaya Sutra, c. 2nd century; Uddyotakara, 6th centuryMilindapanha; Vasubandhu, 4th century

Where does the brain process the self?

There is no single spot. The most-cited synthesis, a 2006 meta-analysis in NeuroImage by Georg Northoff and colleagues, found that judging stimuli as related to oneself, whether words, faces, places or emotions, consistently engaged cortical midline structures: medial prefrontal cortex, anterior and posterior cingulate, and nearby regions. Those overlap heavily with the default mode network, the set of areas more active when a person is resting and thinking than when doing an outward task.

Two facts about this network matter for the old debate:

  • It is not a dedicated "self organ". The same regions handle memory retrieval, imagining the future and thinking about other people.
  • Its activity is not fixed. It shifts with what you attend to and with training, which is exactly what a process view of the self would expect.

Our default mode network explainer covers its anatomy in detail.

Self-referential processing in our brain: a meta-analysis of imaging studies on the selfNorthoff G, Heinzel A, de Greck M, Bermpohl F, Dobrowolny H, Panksepp J · NeuroImage 31(1): 440 to 457 · 2006

The authors pooled PET and fMRI studies that compared self-related with non-self stimuli across verbal, spatial, emotional and facial tasks. Every included study showed activity in cortical midline structures, and cluster and factor analyses split them into ventral, dorsal and posterior groups that did not depend on the task domain. They proposed an integrated cortical-subcortical midline system for the self. The limit: "self-related" here means judging whether something describes you, which is the narrative self; it tells us nothing about a witness behind the judging.

Read the paper
A fluorescence microscope image of cultured rat cortical neurons with branching dendrites
Cultured cortical neurons under a fluorescence microscope. Self-related thinking depends on networks of billions of such cells across the midline of the brain, not on any single location.Photo: ZEISS Microscopy from Germany, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Can training change the sense of self?

Yes, at least the narrative part. A 2007 study by Norman Farb and colleagues in Toronto separated two modes of self-reference: a "narrative" focus, thinking about what a trait word says about you, and an "experiential" focus, simply noticing sensations in the moment. People who had completed an 8-week mindfulness course showed larger and more widespread drops in medial prefrontal activity during the experiential mode than novices, and more use of a right-sided network including the insula.

In novices the two modes were tightly coupled; in the trained group they came apart.

Attending to the present: mindfulness meditation reveals distinct neural modes of self-referenceFarb NAS, Segal ZV, Mayberg H, et al. · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 2(4): 313 to 322 · 2007

Participants enrolling in mindfulness-based stress reduction at St Joseph's Hospital, Toronto, were randomly assigned to be scanned before training (16 people) or after the 8-week course (20 people), with six days of at least 45 minutes' home practice each week. In fMRI, the trained group showed stronger reductions in medial prefrontal cortex during present-moment focus and decoupling between the right insula and medial prefrontal cortex. The authors read this as evidence for two separable neural modes of self-reference. The limit, stated by the authors: a cross-sectional comparison rather than a true before-and-after design, so training cannot be proven as the cause.

Read the paper (free)

Long-term practitioners show a similar pattern. Judson Brewer's 2011 PNAS study scanned 12 meditators averaging 10,565 hours of practice against 13 matched novices. Across concentration, loving-kindness and choiceless awareness meditation, the main default-mode hubs, medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortex, were relatively quieter in the experienced group, and the posterior cingulate was more tightly linked to control regions. The authors flag the moderately small sample themselves. Our post on whether meditation changes the brain weighs how far such findings travel.

How many people the key self-and-meditation brain studies scanned
See the data as a table
Participants (people)
Brewer 2011, meditators vs novices25
Geisler and Meyer 2025, study 132
Farb 2007, trained vs waitlist36
Geisler and Meyer 2025, study 2 (Human Connectome Project data)1086

Source: Brewer et al. PNAS 2011; Farb et al. SCAN 2007; Geisler and Meyer, J Neurosci 2025 · Brewer: 12 meditators plus 13 controls. Farb: 20 trained plus 16 waitlist. Geisler and Meyer study 2 reused open resting-state data from 1,086 adults.

The chart makes a point that headlines skip: the classic contemplative findings rest on a few dozen people each. The 2025 study by Danika Geisler and Meghan Meyer is the exception. They found a default-network pattern that, when it appeared during a short break, predicted that a person would choose to think about themselves seconds later, then showed in resting data from 1,086 adults that people high in internalising traits drift into that pattern more often.

What does each view predict, and which predictions are testable?

Each position makes some claims that data can touch and some that it cannot. Laying them out separately shows where the evidence actually bears.

ClaimWho makes itTestable?What the evidence says
Self-related thinking has no single physical seatAnatta predicts it; Nyaya and Advaita are neutralYesSupported: distributed midline network (Northoff 2006)
The narrative self can be weakened by practiceAnatta; also Advaita's discipline of discriminationYesSupported in small studies (Farb 2007; Brewer 2011)
Self-focus is a habit that can run on its ownAnatta (craving and clinging as processes)YesSupported: a default-network pattern predicts self-focus (Geisler and Meyer 2025)
Memory needs a single persisting ownerNyayaPartlyBrain continuity explains recognition without a separate substance; Nyaya would call that the owner by another name
A pure witness-consciousness underlies all statesAdvaitaNot by imagingUntouched: a scanner measures contents and processes, and the witness by definition has none
Something continues after deathAdvaita, Nyaya; Buddhism (as a stream)No current methodOutside neuroscience

The scorecard leans Buddhist on everything testable. That is not quite a win, because the most careful Advaitins never claimed the narrative self was real either; they would read the same scans as mapping the "not-self".

Showing that the self is constructed is also not the same as showing it is unreal; a constructed thing is still a thing.

The live dispute is not "self or no self" but whether anything is left over once the constructed self is described.

The live dispute is not "self or no self" but whether there is anything left over once the constructed self is described.

Does the Samkhya model fit better than either?

Samkhya offers a third structure that maps surprisingly well onto the data. It splits reality into purusha, a pure witness, and prakriti, nature, which includes intellect (buddhi), ego-sense (ahamkara) and mind (manas).

On that scheme the brain's self-processing is ahamkara at work, a function of nature, while the witness stays outside the system. That lets Samkhya agree with every row of the scorecard above and still keep a self. See our Samkhya tattvas model of mind for the full list. Whether that is a strength or an escape hatch is the question I would put to any reader of Manthan.

Questions people ask

If there is no self, who is reborn in Buddhism?

Classical Buddhism says nothing passes over as a fixed entity; a causal stream continues, the way one flame lights another. The r/secularbuddhism thread on this question shows how often modern readers find that answer unsatisfying, which is why later schools added ideas like "seeds" and store-consciousness.

Is atman the same as the soul?

Not quite. In Advaita, atman is pure consciousness identical with Brahman, with no personal traits. The Nyaya self and the Christian soul are closer to each other: individual, many, and the bearer of a person's mental life.

Does the default mode network prove the self is an illusion?

No. It shows self-related thinking is a distributed, trainable process. That fits the Buddhist analysis of the narrative self, but the same regions also handle memory and imagination, and a process can be real without being a permanent thing.

Can meditation remove the sense of self?

Studies show trained meditators can quieten self-referential brain activity during practice. Reports of temporary loss of the sense of self exist, but they are not always pleasant, and a 2025 survey of about 900 US meditators found 9% reported effects that impaired their functioning, so this is not a goal to chase alone.

Sources

  1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Mind in Indian Buddhist Philosophy
  2. Access to Insight: Vajira Sutta, Sister Vajira (SN 5.10), translated by Thanissaro Bhikkhu (1998; source for the story)
  3. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Logic in Classical Indian Philosophy (Nyaya dates, Uddyotakara)
  4. Northoff et al.: Self-referential processing in our brain, NeuroImage (2006)
  5. Farb et al.: Attending to the present, Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience (2007)
  6. Brewer et al.: Meditation experience and default mode network activity, PNAS (2011)
  7. Geisler and Meyer: A neural signature of the bias toward self-focus, Journal of Neuroscience (2025)
  8. Geisler and Meyer: The default network and social cognition, Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences (2025)
  9. Kim, Lee and Woo: Embodying the default mode network (2025)
  10. Wikipedia: Mauna, with Kena and Mundaka Upanishad passages on the self
  11. ScienceDaily: Van Dam et al. survey of meditation-related adverse effects, Clinical Psychological Science (2025)
  12. r/secularbuddhism: Rebirth and no self and impermanence (2024)
atmananattano-selfdefault mode networkAdvaitaNyayaself-referential processing
Sapta

Sapta (Saptarshi Sarkar) is a mechanical engineer turned marketer in Bengaluru and a solo touring rider. He writes the seven Saptaverse blogs. Work with him or read more of Mindblog.

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