Karma and free will fit together in most Indian philosophy. Past actions (prārabdha karma) fix the conditions you are born into and some results you must live through, while your present choices create new karma, which is why the Bhagavad Gītā can end by telling Arjuna to reflect fully and then "do as you wish". Only a few views, such as the Ājīvika fatalism the Buddha argued against, deny choice outright.
- Prārabdha is the karma already ripening; kriyamāṇa is the karma you make now, and that is where choice lives.
- Gītā 18.14 lists five causes of every action, but 18.63 still leaves the decision to Arjuna.
- AN 6.63: the Buddha defines karma as intention, and AN 3.61 rejects "it's all past karma".
- ~350 ms: Libet's readiness potential before the felt urge, now read by many as averaged noise (Schurger 2012).
- 77% vs 40%: Indian Hindus who believe in karma vs reincarnation (Pew 2021).
The debate keeps flaring on r/hinduism:
- a 2022 thread argued that karma depends on motive and motive depends on free will, so karma without free will collapses;
- a January 2025 thread, "Let's settle it", argued the opposite: karma works like a car's accelerator, cause producing effect with no chooser needed;
- a third asked why so many modern Hindus believe in free will at all.
Both sides can quote scripture, because the texts themselves contain both a strong theory of causation and a strong demand for responsibility. Here is how the major schools fit those together, and what the famous neuroscience of "decisions before awareness" does and does not add. This is philosophy, not religious instruction.
What does karma actually claim?
At its core, karma is a claim about causation in the moral domain: intentional actions leave traces that shape future experience. It says nothing by itself about whether the actions were freely chosen, which is why the free-will question has to be answered separately by each school.
On a full-moon night in the rainy season, King Ajātasattu of Magadha sat on his palace roof terrace with his ministers and asked a question: could anyone show him a fruit of the contemplative life visible here and now? He had already put it to six famous teachers. One of them, Makkhali Gosāla, had told him that beings are purified without cause, that effort counts for nothing, and that everyone reaches the end of suffering after 84,000 great aeons, like a ball of string that runs out as it unwinds.
His physician Jīvaka suggested the Buddha, staying in Jīvaka's mango grove with 1,250 monks. The king set out by elephant, with torch-bearers, and grew so frightened by the silence of so large a crowd that he asked Jīvaka if he was being led into a trap. By the end of the night he had confessed to the Buddha that he had killed his own father, a righteous king, to take the throne.
Sāmaññaphala Sutta (DN 2), tr. Thanissaro Bhikkhu, Access to InsightThe Sāmaññaphala Sutta sets fatalism and moral responsibility side by side in one night. A king who believed nothing he did mattered would have had nothing to confess.
Karma as intention
The Buddhist definition is the sharpest. In the Nibbedhika Sutta (Aṅguttara Nikāya 6.63) the Buddha says: "Intention, I tell you, is kamma." On this reading karma is not fate at all. It is the act of intending, and its results follow from what you intend.
Hindu schools give karma a wider scope, including ritual action and accumulated merit, but they also locate responsibility in the agent's motive, which is the point the 2022 Reddit thread was making.
Three kinds of karma
The Vedāntic tradition splits karma into three stores, often explained with the image of a granary:
- Sañcita is the total stock accumulated over past lives.
- Prārabdha is the portion that has begun to ripen and is being lived out in this body; it is usually called fixed.
- Kriyamāṇa or āgāmi is the karma you are making now, which flows back into the stock and shapes the future.
The model itself builds in room for choice: prārabdha sets the board, kriyamāṇa is your move.
What does the Bhagavad Gītā say about free will?
The Gītā holds two things at once: actions are driven by nature's three qualities (the guṇas) and by many factors besides the agent, yet the agent is responsible for the stance from which it acts. Its closing instruction to Arjuna is a choice, not a command.
Three verses carry the argument:
- Gītā 3.27. All actions are carried out by the guṇas of prakṛti, and only a self deluded by ego thinks "I am the doer".
- Gītā 18.14. Five factors lie behind every action: the body as the seat (adhiṣṭhāna), the doer (kartā), the instruments such as the senses (karaṇa), the various efforts (ceṣṭā), and daiva, the unseen or divine factor. The doer is one cause among five.
- Gītā 18.63. Yet after eighteen chapters, Krishna's closing instruction is to reflect on all of it fully and then act as Arjuna wishes.
The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy reads the Gītā's ethics as a duty-based theory (citing 2.38, 2.47 and 18.47): act because it is right, not for the fruit. Freedom, on that reading, is not a power you start with but something won through practice, a "paradox of development" in which you need some freedom to pursue the discipline that makes you free.
The Gītā's position is therefore compatibilist in spirit. Your actions have causes, including your own nature, but how you relate to them, with or without attachment to results, is the place where choice operates. I compare that to the Stoic version of the same idea in Stoicism and the Gītā.

How do Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita answer it?
All three Vedānta schools give God a role in delivering karma's results, and they differ on how much the individual soul owns its choices. Ramanuja and Madhva both affirm real agency within God's sanction; Śaṅkara affirms it within ordinary experience and denies it at the ultimate level.
Advaita: two levels of truth
Śaṅkara's Advaita argues that karma is insentient and short-lived, so it cannot by itself deliver results long after the act; a conscious Īśvara must administer them, the way an axe moves only when someone swings it.
But for Advaita the whole field of agents, actions and results belongs to the empirical level (vyāvahārika), not the ultimate one (pāramārthika). At the empirical level you choose and are responsible. At the ultimate level there is only Brahman, and the question of a separate chooser does not arise. That is why Advaita teachers can say both "make effort" and "you are not the doer".
Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita: God and the soul
Ramanuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita makes God the sanctioner (anumantā) and overseer of karma, while souls bear responsibility for their acts. God wills only that karma bears fruit; the moral content of the act belongs to the actor.
Madhva's Dvaita gives the strongest role to God and to the soul's innate nature. Only Vishnu is independent (svatantra); souls are dependent (paratantra). Madhva held that souls form a hierarchy by inborn qualities and are predestined toward particular ends, with karma as the mechanism that carries each soul there. Even so, the Dvaita tradition holds that God does not override a soul's will but lets it act according to its nature.
| School | What delivers karma's results | Room for free choice | Key image or text |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bhagavad Gītā | Guṇas, five factors, daiva | Yes, in one's stance toward action | 18.14 five factors; 18.63 "do as you wish" |
| Advaita (Śaṅkara) | Īśvara as administrator | Yes empirically; no separate chooser ultimately | The axe moves only when swung |
| Viśiṣṭādvaita (Ramanuja) | God as sanctioner and overseer | Yes; souls are responsible for their acts | God wills only the fruition |
| Dvaita (Madhva) | Vishnu as independent controller | Limited by innate nature; souls predestined to ends | Svatantra vs paratantra |
| Buddhism (Pali canon) | Intention itself; no creator | Yes; denies that everything is due to past karma | AN 6.63; AN 3.61 |
| Ājīvika (Makkhali Gosāla) | Fate (niyati) and nature | None; no effort or endeavour counts | Ball of string unwinding |
Did the Buddha think karma was fate?
No, he explicitly argued against it. In the Tittha Sutta (Aṅguttara Nikāya 3.61) he rejects three doctrines: that everything you experience is caused by past action, that it is all caused by a creator, and that it happens without any cause.
His argument against the first is practical. If everything is the result of past deeds, then a person who kills or steals does so because of past deeds too, and has no reason to ask "should I do this or not?" Such a person, he says, lives bewildered and unprotected. Strict past-karma determinism makes ethical effort pointless, so it cannot be the teaching.
The view he had in mind was close to that of his contemporary Makkhali Gosāla, leader of the Ājīvikas. In the Sāmaññaphala Sutta (Dīgha Nikāya 2), Gosāla is reported as teaching that beings are defiled and purified without cause, that there is no strength, effort or human endeavour, and that all beings pass through 84,000 great aeons until suffering ends by itself, like a ball of string that runs out as it unwinds.
The Buddhist position is not libertarian free will either. Intentions arise from conditions, including past intentions, and there is no independent self standing behind them to choose (see what gets reborn without a self). The claim is narrower: intentions are real causes, they can be trained, and training them is the whole point of the path.
Two primary texts that together give the Buddhist position. AN 3.61 rejects three total explanations of experience (past action, divine creation, no cause) on the ground that each removes the reason to deliberate about right and wrong. AN 6.63 defines karma as intention, acted out by body, speech and mind. Limit: these are religious texts preserved orally for centuries; they give the tradition's argument, not an empirical finding.
Read AN 3.61 (free)Does neuroscience show free will is an illusion?
No. The famous experiments show that measurable brain activity can precede the moment people report deciding to make a trivial movement. Later work suggests that this activity may reflect random fluctuation rather than a hidden decision, and that it is absent for deliberate choices that matter.
Libet's clock
In 1983 Benjamin Libet and colleagues recorded the readiness potential, a slow negative shift in scalp voltage, while five subjects made simple self-initiated movements, 40 per series, and reported the clock position at which they first felt the urge (W).
- With no pre-planning, the main rise of the readiness potential began on average about 350 milliseconds before W, and at least 150 milliseconds before.
- With some pre-planning, it began about 800 milliseconds before.
Libet concluded that a voluntary act can begin unconsciously. In 2008 John-Dylan Haynes's group reported that the outcome of a simple left-or-right choice could be partly decoded from prefrontal and parietal activity up to 10 seconds before awareness.
The reinterpretation
Two papers changed the reading. In 2012 Aaron Schurger, Jacobo Sitt and Stanislas Dehaene modelled the decision of when to move as a leaky accumulator of noisy neural activity. If the urge to move is weak, the exact moment of crossing the threshold is set mostly by spontaneous fluctuation, and averaging trials time-locked to the movement produces a curve that looks like a slow build-up.
The readiness potential, on this view, is an artefact of averaging noise, not a decision made in advance.
In 2019 Uri Maoz and colleagues compared arbitrary choices with deliberate ones, decisions about donating $1,000 to real non-profits. The readiness potential appeared before arbitrary choices but was "strikingly absent" before deliberate ones.
A leaky stochastic accumulator, fitted to behavioural and EEG data from a Libet-style task, explains the pre-movement build-up as spontaneous sub-threshold fluctuations that look like a ramp once trials are averaged at movement onset. The model predicted, and a second EEG experiment confirmed, a slow negative deflection before fast responses to unpredictable interruptions. Limit: it explains arbitrary timing decisions, not reasoned choices.
Read the paper (free)EEG while participants chose which of two non-profits would receive a $1,000 donation, either deliberately (their real preference) or arbitrarily. Readiness potentials appeared before arbitrary decisions and were absent before deliberate ones, consistent with the RP reflecting accumulated noise. Limit: a small lab sample and button-press responses; it does not settle the metaphysics of free will.
Read the paper (free)| Study | Task | Finding | What it does not show |
|---|---|---|---|
| Libet et al. 1983, Brain | Spontaneous self-initiated movement, 5 subjects | RP rise about 350 ms before reported urge (type II) | That the RP is a decision, or that conscious veto is impossible |
| Soon et al. 2008, Nature Neuroscience | Left or right button choice | Choice partly decodable up to 10 s early | High accuracy, or anything about weighty decisions |
| Schurger et al. 2012, PNAS | Libet-style task plus model | RP explained as averaged neural noise | That all decisions work this way |
| Maoz et al. 2019, eLife | $1,000 donation choices | RP present for arbitrary, absent for deliberate choices | Whether deliberation is itself fully determined |
Note what none of this touches. Even if every decision has neural causes, that is determinism, and determinism is exactly what the karma framework already assumes.
The Indian schools were never arguing that choices are uncaused. They argued about whether causes that run through your own intentions, deliberation and training count as yours.
Compatibilist philosophers in the West say yes, and so, in different ways, do the Gītā, Ramanuja and the Buddha.
Why do most Indians believe in karma but not rebirth?
Because the popular idea of karma is mostly about consequences in this life. Pew's 2021 survey of 29,999 Indian adults found 77% of Hindus believe in karma but only 40% in reincarnation, and the same gap among Muslims and Jains.
That gap suggests that for most people "karma" means something like moral cause and effect, which needs responsibility and therefore needs some kind of choice. It answers the third Reddit thread: modern Hindus believe in free will because the karma they actually use day to day is a theory of accountability, not a theory of fate.
Plug in a group size, such as your office, your building or your WhatsApp family group, to see what Pew's shares imply.
Karma and rebirth belief in a group of Indian Hindus
See the data as a table
| Believe in karma (%) | Believe in reincarnation (%) | |
|---|---|---|
| Hindus | 77 | 40 |
| Muslims | 77 | 27 |
| Jains | 75 | 23 |
Source: Pew Research Center, Religion in India (29,999 adults, 2019–20)

So how should we read "it's my karma"?
As a description of starting conditions, not as an excuse. Every major school except the fatalists treats the present intention as the one place where karma is still being made.
- Prārabdha is the hand you were dealt: body, family, era, some events you cannot avoid. The schools agree it has to be lived through.
- Kriyamāṇa is the play: what you intend now. The Gītā asks you to act without clinging to results; the Buddha asks you to train intention itself.
- Determinism is not fatalism: even if choices have causes, deliberation is one of those causes. Fatalism, like Gosāla's, says outcomes come regardless of what you do, and both the Buddha and the Gītā reject it.
- Grace is not a loophole: in Ramanuja and Madhva, God sanctions karma's results but does not author your intentions.
The schools' metaphysics of self and God, which drive these differences, are laid out in Advaita vs Dvaita vs Viśiṣṭādvaita. How the Gītā's idea of desireless action travelled to Emerson, Thoreau and Gandhi is in the Gītā in the West, and the Indian roots of logical argument behind all these debates in the history of Nyāya logic. For the wider map of the mind, see Manthan.
What's new
- Review of what changes the size of the readiness potential concludes attention is the most consistent factor Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 2026
- New theory paper argues the feeling of free will is a conditioned "superstitious" belief compatible with determinism Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 2026
- Pew's India survey remains the largest dataset on karma belief: 77% of Hindus and Muslims, 75% of Jains Pew Research Center, 2021
Questions people ask
Is karma the same as destiny?
Not in the classical schools. Destiny (daiva or niyati) can be one factor, as in Gītā 18.14, but karma also includes the new actions you are making now. Only fatalist schools such as the Ājīvikas equated the two.
Can prārabdha karma be changed?
Vedāntic teachers usually call it fixed: it has started to bear fruit and must be lived out. What can change is the new karma you add and your attitude to what prārabdha brings.
Does the Libet experiment disprove free will?
No. It showed brain activity before the reported urge to make a trivial movement. Schurger's 2012 model explains that activity as averaged noise, and Maoz's 2019 study found it absent before deliberate choices.
If God gives the fruits of karma, am I still responsible?
Ramanuja's answer is yes: God is the sanctioner who lets karma bear fruit, while the moral content of the act belongs to the soul. Śaṅkara uses the image of an axe that moves only when swung to make the same separation of roles.
Sources
- Bhagavad Gita 3.27, text and translation
- Bhagavad Gita 18.14, text and translation
- Bhagavad Gita 18.63, text and translation
- Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Bhagavad Gita
- Wikipedia: Karma in Hinduism (three types of karma; Vedānta school positions with cited scholarship)
- Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Madhva
- Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Rāmānuja
- Tittha Sutta (AN 3.61), tr. Thanissaro Bhikkhu
- Nibbedhika Sutta (AN 6.63), tr. Thanissaro Bhikkhu
- Sāmaññaphala Sutta (DN 2), tr. Thanissaro Bhikkhu
- Libet B, Gleason CA, Wright EW, Pearl DK. Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity. Brain 106(3):623-642 (1983)
- Soon CS, Brass M, Heinze HJ, Haynes JD. Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain. Nature Neuroscience 11:543-545 (2008)
- Schurger A, Sitt JD, Dehaene S. An accumulator model for spontaneous neural activity prior to self-initiated movement. PNAS 109(42) (2012)
- Maoz U, Yaffe G, Koch C, Mudrik L. Neural precursors of decisions that matter. eLife 8:e39787 (2019)
- Pew Research Center: Religion in India, religious beliefs (2021)
